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IF IT’S NOT BROKE, DON’T FIX IT: IGNORING CRITICISMS OF 
SUPREME COURT RECUSALS 
INTRODUCTION 
An impartial decision-maker is essential to the American notion of justice. 
The Declaration of Independence listed the lack of judicial independence as 
one of the American people’s primary grievances.1 Since 1789, Supreme Court 
Justices have taken an oath to “administer justice without respect to persons, 
and do equal right to the poor and rich, and [to] faithfully and impartially 
discharge and perform all [their] duties . . . .”2 Courthouses around the country 
display a blindfolded Lady Justice to represent that justice is “even-handed and 
equally administered to all, irrespective of any and all considerations.”3 
Recusal is one tool used to ensure that Supreme Court Justices are the 
impartial decision-makers that litigants and the public expect. Public opinion 
matters because the Supreme Court is unlike the other branches of government, 
which derive authority from the electoral process.4 The Court’s only authority 
is its institutional authority, which depends on its ability to command the 
respect and trust of the public.5 The public will only respect and trust Supreme 
Court opinions if “the American people believe [the Justices] to be impartial 
and above any particular political or financial interests.”6 If the public believes 
that the Justices have a personal or political agenda, then the public will be less 
 
 1. “The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and 
usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. 
. . . He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the 
amount and payment of their salaries.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 11 (U.S. 
1776). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006). 
 3. Koppelman v. C.I.R., 202 F.2d 955, 956 (3d. Cir. 1953). 
 4. Jeffrey Rosen, Larry Kramer, Sandra Day O’Connor, Stephen Breyer, Does the Supreme 
Court Follow the People? at 14 (Aspen Idea Festival 2011) [hereinafter Does the Supreme Court 
Follow the People?] (transcript available at http://www.aifestival.org/sites/default/files/tran 
scripts/AIF11_050_does_SCOTUS_follow_public.pdf). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Letter from Rep. Christopher Murphy et al. to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary (Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Rep. Christopher Murphy], in Eric 
Lichtblau, Democrats Seek to Impose Tougher Supreme Court Ethics, THE CAUCUS BLOG (Sept. 
8, 2011, 6:43 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/democrats-seek-to-impose-
tougher-supreme-court-ethics/. 
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willing to accept the Court’s decisions and the integrity and legitimacy of the 
Court will be harmed.7 
The Supreme Court recusal process seems to become part of mainstream 
media when the line between justice and politics becomes blurred. For 
example, in 2004, Vice President Dick Cheney was named in his official 
capacity as the Vice President of the United States and Chairman of the 
Cheney Energy Task Force as a defendant in a case before the Supreme Court.8 
About three weeks after the Court granted certiorari, Justice Antonin Scalia 
and Cheney went on a duck-hunting trip together.9 A journalist at the L.A. 
Times broke the news about the trip,10 and news outlets across the nation 
picked up the story.11 Details about the trip’s length, travel arrangements, 
lodging, financing, and other attendees leaked out bit by bit.12 Political 
cartoons and late-night monologues followed.13 Senators Patrick Leahy and 
Joseph Lieberman wrote to Chief Justice William Rehnquist asking about the 
High Court’s policies on conflict of interest: “When a sitting judge, poised to 
hear a case involving a particular litigant, goes on vacation with that litigant, 
reasonable people will question whether that judge can be a fair and impartial 
adjudicator of that man’s case or his opponent’s claims.”14 By the time a 
motion asking Justice Scalia to recuse himself was filed, twenty of the thirty 
largest newspapers in America had explicitly called on Justice Scalia to 
disqualify himself.15 Not a single newspaper had argued against 
disqualification.16 “[T]he American public . . . ha[d] unanimously concluded 
that there is an appearance of favoritism . . . which mandates recusal . . . .”17 
 
 7. Nina Totenberg, Bill Puts Ethics Spotlight on Supreme Court Justices, NPR (Aug. 17, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/17/139646573/bill-puts-ethics-spotlight-on-supreme-court-
justices. 
 8. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 918 (2004). 
 9. Mot. to Recuse at 2, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (No. 03-
475). 
 10. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial 
Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 572–73 (2005) (citing David Savage, Trip with Cheney Puts 
Ethics Spotlight on Scalia, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at A1). 
 11. Totenberg, supra note 7. 
 12. Frost, supra note 10, at 577. 
 13. Mot. to Recuse, supra note 9, at 5–6. 
 14. Frost, supra note 10, at 574 (quoting Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on 
Governmental Affairs, to The Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States (Jan. 22, 2004)). Chief Justice Rehnquist was not amused by their inquiry. Frost, 
supra note 10, at 574. Rehnquist responded to their letter by chastising the Senators for criticizing 
the actions of a Justice while the case was pending, instead of waiting until the case had been 
decided. Id. 
 15. Mot. to Recuse, supra note 9, at 3. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 3–4. 
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Several weeks later, Justice Scalia issued a twenty-one-page memorandum 
defending his decision not to recuse.18 
Debate over Supreme Court recusals ignited anew surrounding the Obama 
administration’s health care reform law, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”). Health care has been a particularly 
polarizing issue in American politics in recent years.19 Those on all sides of the 
dispute expected the new law to ultimately reach the Supreme Court.20 It was 
inevitable that the Justices were going to be “drawn into the political fray.”21 
And with the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari to hear the constitutional 
challenges to the law, calls for the self-recusal of Justice Elena Kagan and 
Justice Clarence Thomas intensified.22 
Justice Kagan was urged to recuse herself because of her previous position 
as U.S. Solicitor General, the federal government’s top lawyer at the Supreme 
Court.23 Kagan was notified by the White House in March 2010, just before the 
Affordable Care Act was passed, that she was under consideration to be named 
to the Supreme Court.24 Upon learning this, Kagan stated she then abstained 
from discussing the inevitable legal challenges to the health care reform law 
with the White House and the Justice Department.25 She said she attended only 
one meeting where the litigation was briefly mentioned and none where the 
litigation was substantively discussed.26 Kagan also said she was never asked 
her opinion about the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, or the 
underlying legal issues in the litigation.27 Nor had she ever reviewed 
government documents.28 Additionally, Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr. said 
lawyers went out of their way to keep from involving Kagan in the 
discussions.29 The political right, however, questioned the effectiveness of the 
 
 18. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004). 
 19. Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Health Care and Recusal Politics, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 28, 
2011, 12:25 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/analysis-health-care-and-recusal-politics/. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on March 26−28, 2011. Lyle Denniston, Court 
Sets 5½-Hour Hearing on Heatlh Care, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2011, 10:49 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/court-sets-5-12-hour-hearing-on-health-care/. 
 23. Robert Barnes, Health-Care Case Brings Fight over Which Supreme Court Justices 
Should Decide It, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/health-
care-case-brings-fight-over-which-supreme-court-justices-should-decide-it/2011/11/22/gIQAw 
RWb2N_story.html. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Barnes, supra note 23. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
524 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:521 
“Chinese wall.”30 Emails released following a Freedom of Information Act 
request show Kagan wanted the Solicitor General’s office involved in strategy 
decisions regarding the health care reform law and also show her personal 
enthusiasm for the law.31 
Justice Thomas was urged to recuse himself as well. His wife, Virginia 
Thomas, was an outspoken opponent of the Affordable Care Act; before she 
stepped down as the CEO of Liberty Central, its website characterized the law 
as “tyranny” and demanded the repeal of “ObamaCare.”32 Virginia Thomas 
received financial contributions for her advocacy from well-known 
conservative donors with whom Justice Thomas has also been associated.33 
Justice Thomas had also spoken at events sponsored by organizations opposed 
to the Affordable Care Act.34 Combined, these reasons led critics to question 
whether Justice Thomas could maintain the appearance of impartiality when 
the Affordable Care Act comes before the Court.35 
The demands for Justices Kagan and Thomas to recuse themselves came 
against a backdrop of intense criticism of Supreme Court ethics by members of 
Congress, the legal community, and advocacy groups.36 Some members of 
Congress feared the public’s faith in the judicial system and the integrity of the 
country’s highest court had been eroded “after several recent questionable 
actions by some of its members” and “alarming reports” of Justices fundraising 
for political organizations.37 In March 2011, Representative Christopher 
Murphy from Connecticut sponsored “The Supreme Court Transparency and 
Disclosure Act of 2011,” (the “Murphy Bill”) which seeks, in part, to amend 
the recusal process.38 The bill calls for Justices to publicly disclose their 
reasons for disqualifying themselves sua sponte or in response to a party’s 
motion, and also their reasons for refusing recusal and instead remaining on a 
case.39 The bill also seeks the creation of a process to further review any such 
refusals to recuse.40 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Steven Lubet, Let the Justices Be the Judge, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2010), http://articles. 
Chicagotribune.com/2010-10-27/news/ct-oped-1027-activism-20101027_1_health-care-justice-
elena-kagan-supreme-court-justices. 
 33. Denniston, supra note 19. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Lyle Denniston, A Defense of Justices’ Ethics, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 31, 2010, 6:01 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/12/a-defense-of-justices-ethics/. 
 37. Letter from Rep. Christopher Murphy, supra note 6. 
 38. H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at § 3(b). 
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Similarly, a group of over one hundred law professors from around the 
United States sent a letter to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees in 
March 2011 calling for transparent, reviewable Supreme Court recusal 
decisions.41 The professors criticized the Supreme Court’s non-reviewable 
recusal decisions, which they claim “turn solely on the silent opinion of the 
challenged justice,” for eroding public confidence in the Court and harming the 
integrity and legitimacy of the Supreme Court.42 The professors pointed to 
Lord Coke’s seventeenth century articulation that “no man may be a judge in 
his own case,” and lamented that “inexplicably we still allow Supreme Court 
justices to be the sole judge of themselves on recusal issues.”43 
Both the demands for Justices Kagan and Thomas to recuse themselves 
and the proposals for revising the recusal statute are misguided, however. 
Without considering historical evidence or current facts, critics have bought 
into the media frenzy, indulged doubts about the integrity of Supreme Court 
Justices,44 and ignored assurances from parties who are actually informed 
about the mechanics of the Court and recusal. 
Part I of this paper discusses the history of the federal recusal statute. Part 
II describes the criticisms of the recusal statute and proposed revisions and 
explains why this is a situation in which the cures are worse than the disease. 
Finally, Part III presents the argument that current criticisms of the recusal 
process are misguided and no revision of the process is necessary. 
I.  HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RECUSAL STATUTE 
Under English common law, there was no recusal for bias.45 It was 
understood that part of a judge’s job was to set aside personal interests and 
biases, “to rise above personal considerations,” and to decide the case on the 
merits.46 In America, Congress has set the standard for judicial recusal since 
1792. The first federal recusal statute required a judge to remove himself from 
a case when he was “concerned in interest, or ha[d] been of counsel for either 
party.”47 However, similar to English common law, the statute did not prohibit 
 
 41. Letter from Mark N. Anderson et al. to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary (Mar. 17, 2011) [hereinafter “Letter from Law Professors”], available at http://www.afj. 
org/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See supra notes 10-13, 15-17 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1096 
(2004) (contrasting with U.S. recusal statutes). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278 (“That in all suits and actions in any district 
court of the United states, in which it shall appear that the judge of such court is, any ways, 
concerned in interest, or has been of counsel for either party, it shall be the duty of such judge on 
application of either party, to cause the fact to be entered on the minutes of the court, and also to 
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judges from hearing cases in which they might be biased against, or in favor 
of, one of the parties.48 For example, Marbury v. Madison, “our legal culture’s 
most revered judicial decision,” might have been resolved differently, and the 
Constitutional Law experience of every law student changed, had the recusal 
statute contained more than two specific grounds for judicial qualification.49 
William Marbury had been appointed by President John Adams to serve as 
Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia.50 After President Adams 
signed Marbury’s commission, Secretary of State John Marshall sealed it.51 
But Marbury’s commission was never delivered because Marshall left it 
behind in his desk as he departed the Secretary of State’s office to become 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,52 and Marbury petitioned the Supreme 
Court to force the new Secretary of State to deliver the commission.53 Chief 
Justice Marshall not only caused the litigation, he authored the opinion and 
determined its outcome.54 
Recusal for bias became part of the statute in 1821 when the recusal 
standard was expanded to require a judge to recuse himself when, in his 
opinion, he had a relation or connection to a party that would make it improper 
to sit.55 In 1911, Congress broadened the recusal statute again and required a 
 
order an authenticated copy thereof, with all the proceedings in such suit or action, to be forthwith 
certified to the next circuit court of the district, which circuit court shall, thereupon, take 
cognizance thereof, in the like manner, as if it had been originally commenced in that court, and 
shall proceed to hear and determine the same accordingly.”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1390 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 137–38 (1803). 
 51. Id. at 138. 
 52. Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1390. 
 53. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137–38. 
 54. Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1390. 
 55. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643 (“That in all suits and actions in any district court 
of the United states, in which it shall appear that the judge of such court is, any ways, concerned 
in interest, or has been of counsel for either party, or is so related to, or connected with, either 
party as to render it improper for him, in his opinion, to sit on the trial of such suit or action, it 
shall be the duty of such judge, on application of either party, to cause the fact to be entered on 
the records of the court; and, also, an order that an authenticated copy thereof, with all the 
proceedings in such suit or action, shall be forthwith certified to the next circuit court of the 
district; and if there be no circuit court in such district, to the next circuit court in the state; and if 
there be no circuit court in such state, to the most convenient circuit court in an adjacent state; 
which circuit court shall, upon such record being filed with the clerk thereof, take cognisance 
thereof, in the like manner as if such suit or action had been originally commenced in that court, 
and shall proceed to hear and determine the same accordingly; and the jurisdiction of such circuit 
court shall extend to all such cases so removed, as were cognisable in the district court from 
which the same was removed.”). 
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judge to recuse himself when he was a material witness for either party.56 In 
1948, the recusal statute was codified as 28 U.S.C. § 455,57 and Congress made 
several more changes. First, the statute was amended to apply to “[a]ny justice 
of judge of the United States,”58 while previous versions of the statute applied 
only to district court judges.59 Supreme Court recusals were now covered by 
the statute. Second, Congress added that it was improper for a judge to sit on a 
case not only when the judge had a relation or connection to a party, but also a 
relation or connection to a party’s attorney.60 Third, it was no longer required 
that a party seek the judge’s disqualification before the judge had to remove 
himself; judges were now under an obligation to recuse themselves when they 
knew of their own partiality.61 Finally, Congress uncharacteristically narrowed 
the recusal statute by qualifying that a judge’s interest in a case must be 
“substantial” in order to warrant recusal.62 
Generally speaking, by 1948, the recusal statute required nothing more 
than it had in 1821—a judge was prohibited from presiding when he had an 
interest in the case or a relationship to a party. The statute was simply not as 
effective as Congress had intended.63 The recusal determination was entirely 
subjective—a judge personally decided, “in his opinion,” whether an interest 
or relationship made it improper to sit.64 The statute was “indefinite and 
ambiguous” and provided little guidance to judges making a recusal 
 
 56. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090 (“Whenever it appears that the 
judge of any district court is in any way concerned in interest in any suit pending therein, or has 
been of counsel or is a material witness for either party, or is so related to or connected with 
either party as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, it shall be his duty, 
on application by either party, to cause the fact to be entered on the records of the court; and also 
an order that an authenticated copy thereof shall be forthwith certified to the senior circuit judge 
for said circuit then present in the circuit; and thereupon such proceedings shall be had as are 
provided in section fourteen.”). 
 57. FED. JUD. CTR., RECUSAL: ANALYSIS OF CASELAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144 at 2 
(2002) (quoting Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 869, 908) (“Any justice or judge of 
the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has 
been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party 
or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other 
proceeding therein.”). 
 58. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 455) 
(amended 1974). 
 59. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090; Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 
643. 
 60. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (amended 1974). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 1–2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6352. 
 64. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 47, at 2. 
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determination.65 Judges were able to narrowly construe the mandatory grounds 
for disqualification to limit the reach of the recusal statute.66 Judges also 
created a “duty to sit” and would resolve close disqualification issues against 
recusal based on the obligation to decide the cases to which judges were 
assigned.67 Congress felt that § 455 weakened the public’s confidence in the 
judicial system.68 
In 1974, Congress “made massive changes” to § 455 to broaden and clarify 
the grounds for judicial disqualification.69 The one-paragraph statute was 
transformed into a lengthy statute with multiple sections, subsections, and 
subsections to the subsections.70 
Subsection (a) was “an entirely new ‘catchall’ provision” incorporated into 
§ 45571 intended “to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial 
process.”72 It required recusal when the justice’s “impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”73 Subsection (a) replaced the subjective standard of 
the 1948 recusal statute and required judges to evaluate their interests, 
relationships, biases, and prejudices on an objective basis “from the 
perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding 
facts and circumstances.”74 “The decision whether a judge’s impartiality can 
‘reasonably be questioned’ is to be made in light of the facts as they existed, 
and not as they were surmised or reported.”75 What matters under § 455(a) is 
“not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.”76 
The language of subsection (a) also had the effect of abolishing the duty to 
sit77 which judges relied on to deny requests for recusal in “all but the most 
 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 2 (“These statutory and ethical provisions proved to be not 
only indefinite and ambiguous, but also, in certain situations, conflicting. The uncertainty of who 
was a ‘near relative’ or of when the judge was ‘so related’ caused problems in application of both 
the statutory and the ethical standards. While the Canon required disqualification for involvement 
of ‘his personal interests’, the statute required such action only when it was ‘a substantial 
interest.’”). 
 66. Frost, supra note 10, at 541 (citing Randal J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of 
Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 239 (1978)). 
 67. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 47, at 2. 
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 2. 
 69. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 546 (1994). 
 70. See Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609. 
 71. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548. 
 72. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859–60 (1988). 
 73. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). 
 74. Id.; Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004). 
 75. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 914. 
 76. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000). 
 77. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355. 
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blatant circumstances.”78 The duty to sit was replaced by a “presumption of 
disqualification.”79 When there was a reasonable factual basis for doubting a 
judge’s impartiality, the judge was to disqualify himself.80 Congress made 
clear that close cases were to be resolved in favor of disqualification.81 The 
House Report to the Judiciary noted it was unanimously agreed that 
eliminating the duty to sit “would enhance public confidence in the impartiality 
of the judicial system.”82 
Subsection (b) of the amended statute focused on the “interest” and 
“relationship” elements of the 1948 recusal statute and provided specific, 
objective instances in which recusal was necessary.83 Congress sought to 
eliminate the ambiguous and uncertain language of the 1948 statute to help 
judges avoid criticism for failure to disqualify themselves.84 There are now 
five specific situations in which recusal is mandatory and cannot be waived. A 
judge must recuse for personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal 
knowledge of the facts.85 Recusal is also required when the judge, or a lawyer 
with whom the judge previously practiced law, has served as a lawyer or 
material witness in the matter in controversy.86 The judge is required to recuse 
when they or their family has a financial interest in the proceeding.87 Recusal 
is also required when the judge or their family is a party, a lawyer, or a 
witness, or has some other substantial interest in the proceeding.88 Finally, 
recusal is required when the judge was previously employed by the 
government and participated as a judge, counsel, advisor, or material witness 
in the proceeding, or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the 
proceeding.89 
 
 78. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to 
Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 864 (2009) (quoting RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL 
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 604–05 (2d ed. 2007)). 
 79. Stempel, supra note 78, at 864. 
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 4. 
 81. Stempel, supra note 78, at 866. 
 82. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 4. However, Supreme Court Justices in particular continue to 
evoke the “duty to sit.” See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 915–16 (2004).; 
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 
(2012). 
 83. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 47, at 5. 
 84. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 at 1–2. 
 85. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2006); FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 47, at 6. 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2). 
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3). 
 88. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4). 
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5). 
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II.  CRITICISMS OF THE RECUSAL PROCESS, POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS, AND 
PROBLEMS WITH THE POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
For over 200 years, Congress has tinkered with the substantive aspect of 
the recusal standard and the grounds which demand recusal.90 Current 
criticisms, however, take aim at the procedural aspects of the recusal standard 
and the lack of basic procedural elements. Under the current recusal statute, § 
455, recusal is an “ad hoc and informal process.”91 Decisions are not 
transparent or reviewable.92 “[W]e are just left believing the word of the 
[J]ustices.”93 The recusal process is missing basic procedural elements 
typically viewed as indispensable to democratic adjudication.94 This paper 
focuses on two of them: the lack of a neutral decision-maker and the lack of a 
written explanation for decisions.95 
A. Lack of a Neutral Decision-Maker 
One point of general agreement in the justice system is that “no man may 
be a judge in his own case.”96 Yet at the Supreme Court the decision to recuse 
has always rested with each individual Justice, and there is no process 
available to review that decision.97 Scholars have criticized the recusal 
practice,98 the media has questioned the wisdom of it,99 and the Court itself has 
even expressed skepticism that “the sole trier of fact is the one accused of 
bias.”100 Critics argue that leaving the recusal decision wholly up to the very 
Justice being asked to disqualify him or herself is problematic because it is 
unrealistic to expect anyone to be able to candidly assess the extent of their 
 
 90. Frost, supra note 10, at 533–34. Professor Frost argues that it has never been effective to 
alter the substance of the recusal standard because each time Congress has broadened the recusal 
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disqualification statutes from being employed as fully and broadly as Congress intended.” Id. 
 91. Id. at 536. 
 92. Letter from Law Professors, supra note 41. 
 93. Totenberg, supra note 7. 
 94. Frost, supra note 10, at 535–36. 
 95. For procedural elements not discussed by this paper, see Frost, supra note 10, at 557–65 
 96. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 592–93 
(1987) (quoting Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 114a (C.P.) 118a (quoting Lord Coke)). 
 97. Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse? Recusal and the Procedural Void 
in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 109 (2004). 
 98. Timothy J. Goodson, Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting for Better Recusal Practices in the 
United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v. United States District Court, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
181, 217 n.191 (2005). 
 99. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Odd Court Routine: Being the Judge of Whether to Be the Judge, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950CE 
FDE153AF935A25752C1A9669D8B63. 
 100. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2264 (2009). 
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own bias.101 Judge Richard Posner thinks it is especially problematic when it 
comes to Supreme Court Justices.102 “Cocooned in their marble palace, 
attended by sycophantic staff, and treated with extreme deference wherever 
they go, Supreme Court Justices are at risk of acquiring an exaggerated opinion 
of their ability and character.”103 Judges are human and certainly make 
mistakes, and decisions to recuse are no exception.104 But on the United States 
Supreme Court—the court of last resort, critics find the mistakes particularly 
troublesome because there is no recourse.105 
One of the more popular suggestions for reforming the recusal process is to 
make the Justices’ recusal decisions reviewable.106 Some commentators have 
advocated allowing the Justice who is the target of the motion to recuse to 
continue to make the initial determination; if the Justice refuses to recuse, one 
or more of the remaining eight Justices should review the decision.107 
Similarly, the Murphy Bill108 recommends that the Justices review each others’ 
refusals to recuse, and also proposes that retired Justices and/or federal district 
court, circuit court, and senior judges could review Supreme Court refusals to 
recuse.109 Advocates of the review process believe that it will ensure the 
recusal decision is handled objectively from those in a better position to 
evaluate the arguments, and the decision will be more respected by the 
public.110 
There are some problems, however, with the suggestion to make Supreme 
Court recusal decisions reviewable. To begin with, having lower court judges 
review a Supreme Court Justice’s decision is unworkable and potentially 
unconstitutional. Herman Schwartz, an American University law professor 
 
 101. Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Hearing Before 
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22 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Charles G. Geyh, Assoc. Dean of Research, Prof. of 
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 103. Id. 
 104. See Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2265 (2009). 
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 107. Hearing, supra note 101, at 22 (statement of Charles G. Geyh, Assoc. Dean of Research, 
Prof. of Law, Ind. Univ.); Roberts, supra note 97, at 169. 
 108. See Letter from Rep. Christopher Murphy, supra note 6. 
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who signed the letter to Congress asking for mandatory and enforceable ethical 
rules for the Supreme Court,111 called the Murphy Bill “clearly very 
flawed.”112 He added that “no lower court judge would dare say [J]ustice so-
and-so should have recused him or herself.”113 Additionally, the denial of a 
recusal motion is a judicial act, and Supreme Court judicial acts are not subject 
to appeal.114 Authorizing a party to “seek further review”115 of a Supreme 
Court Justice’s denial of a motion to recuse is the same thing as permitting an 
appeal, and it results in the creation of a court higher than the Supreme Court, 
which violates the Constitutional mandate of “one supreme Court.”116 
“[E]stablishing any sort of supervisory body over the Supreme Court, even a 
supervisory body made of themselves, would fundamentally change the 
principle of judicial independence.”117 
Another problem with having the Justices review each other’s recusal 
decisions is it could “make for awkward intra-Justice relations,”118 or even 
worse, destroy the collegiality of the Court.119 Justice Kagan has called the 
Supreme Court “an incredibly collegial and warm institution.”120 Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg told her law school classmates at their fifty-year reunion that 
the Supreme Court is “the most collegial place I have ever worked.”121 
Collegiality at the Supreme Court goes beyond mutual understanding, respect, 
and working toward a common goal: the Justices are genuine friends. As 
Justice Ginsburg stated, “despite our sharp differences on certain issues . . . we 
remain good friends, people who respect each other and genuinely enjoy each 
other’s company.”122 The Justices make it a point to each lunch together every 
day they are at the Court.123 Former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and former 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist were friends for over fifty years and shared 
backyard barbeques and family vacations.124 Justice Ginsburg and Justice 
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 112. Totenberg, supra note 7. 
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Scalia, along with their spouses, have spent every New Year’s Eve together for 
over twenty years.125 Justice Clarence Thomas is “universally adored” by his 
fellow Justices, and he and Justice Breyer often whisper, joke, and pass notes 
mocking one another during oral arguments.126 
Camaraderie and collegiality is highly valued at the Supreme Court,127 
where Justices are appointed for life, sit on cases with one another year after 
year,128 “and seek to forge coalitions from term to term.”129 “[It is a] difficult 
task [to pass] upon the integrity of a fellow member of the bench,”130 and the 
Justices will be hesitant to institute a review policy that might be viewed as 
disrespectful to one another. It is a long-established and time-honored tradition 
of the Court to allow Justices to individually decide whether or not to sit in any 
case.131 “Once a Justice has made a judgment, the other Justices are not going 
to publicly review that and say, ‘You done wrong.’”132 Justices will be 
additionally hesitant to institute a review policy because no other federal court 
requires its members to sit in judgment of each other’s recusal decisions.133 
A third problem with the creation of a formal review process is it is based 
on a fallacy that the Justices make recusal decisions without consulting 
anyone. In his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice 
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Roberts reiterated what Justices have long been saying: they consult a wide 
variety of authority to resolve ethical issues, including issues of recusal.134 
First, and foremost, the Justices informally consult one another.135 After 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s death, the Library of Congress opened his papers 
to the public, and it was revealed that in 1984, when Marshall decided he no 
longer wanted to recuse himself in cases in which the NAACP participated, he 
sent a memo to his fellow justices seeking their advice.136 In 1993, the Justices 
consulted with one another regarding recusal when a relative’s firm was 
involved in a case before the Court, and they issued a “Statement of Recusal 
Policy” detailing their views.137 In 2000, Chief Justice Rehnquist gave a 
statement when he refused to recuse himself in Microsoft and stated he had 
“reviewed the relevant legal authorities and consulted with [his] colleagues.”138 
Justice John Paul Stevens told the Washington Post that in 2003 he considered 
recusing himself in Grutter v. Bollinger because the dean of the University of 
Michigan law school was one of his former law clerks; however, in keeping 
with the usual practice on the Court, he consulted his colleagues, and they 
“unanimously and very firmly” told him not to recuse.139 In 2004, Justice 
Ginsburg told the University of Connecticut School of Law, “[i]n the end it is a 
decision the individual Justice makes, but always with consultation among the 
rest of us.”140 
Aside from consulting one another when making recusal decisions, the 
Justices also consult precedent and consider treatises, scholarly publications, 
and disciplinary decisions.141 The Justices seek advice from the Court’s Legal 
Office. 142 They present questions to the Judicial Conference’s Committee on 
Codes of Conduct, which gives informal advice and written opinions to help 
judges comply with ethical principles. 143 The Justices also consult with law 
professors and ethics experts.144 
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Creating a process to review Supreme Court recusal decisions is a 
dangerous proposition because it is potentially unconstitutional and could 
change the collegial atmosphere of the Court. And if critics would only listen 
to the Justices, they would see that it is also unnecessary for the purpose of 
ensuring the decision is objective. 
B. Lack of a Written Explanation 
Courts gain legitimacy by explaining the reasoning for their decisions.145 
An explanation demonstrates that a judge’s decision was deliberate, 
dispassionate, rational, and based on law, as opposed to being a gut reaction, 
arbitrary, or based on personal preferences.146 Explanations also contribute to 
the creation of a body of caselaw, which is useful for standardizing decision-
making, minimizing inconsistencies, and promoting predictability.147 
The Supreme Court’s recusal practices are not well understood. When a 
litigant files a motion to recuse, the Justice’s decision is memorialized as a one 
page, typically one-sentence, unpublished order directed to the parties.148 
When a Justice recuses sua sponte, a short statement appears in the case report 
that the Justice took no part in the decision being reported.149 Justices rarely 
issue substantive opinions explaining their decision not to recuse,150 and it is 
virtually unprecedented for a Justice to issue an opinion justifying recusal.151 
As a result, Justices take a “hodgepodge of approaches”,152 and recusals at the 
Supreme Court are “sometimes rigorous, sometimes idiosyncratic, and often 
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quite mysterious.153 Critics argue that the lack of transparency undermines the 
very purpose of the recusal statute, which is to promote public confidence in 
impartiality of the judiciary.154 
Critics want the Justices to issue written statements explaining their 
reasons when they recuse themselves, both sua sponte and in response to a 
party motion, and their reasons when they refuse to recuse themselves155 
because “[i]t is essential to have a public enunciation of the standards by which 
the Court reaches its decisions.”156 Written explanations would ensure the 
Justices are “abid[ing] by the rule of law and not political influence or 
ideology.”157 Written explanations would also provide people “something real 
and concrete” from which they can assess whether justice is being achieved, 
rather than forcing people to resort to guesswork.158 Finally, written 
explanations would lay the foundation for when recusal is appropriate and 
facilitate consistent decisions in later cases presenting similar circumstances.159 
There are some problems, however, with the suggestion that Supreme 
Court Justices publicly disclose why they have recused, or refused to recuse, 
themselves. First, requiring Justices to provide an explanation each time they 
recuse or refuse to recuse far exceeds the public’s need to know. Justices are 
subjected to a public Senate confirmation process in which their personal and 
professional backgrounds are examined.160 They are subjected to continuing 
mandatory financial disclosures, which are publicly available.161 Supreme 
Court Justices are highly visible public figures so it is easy to track their 
appearances at events and find out what they might have said. Therefore, 
requiring Justices to provide the public with information beyond the vast 
amount that is already publicly available is a nuisance. It is also intrusive 
because the reasons on which the Justice’s recusal decision is based could be 
highly personal or of a sensitive nature, and the Justice’s privacy, or another 
person’s privacy, might need to be protected.162 The Justices’ right to maintain 
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a modicum of privacy outweighs the benefits of satisfying the public’s 
curiosity and establishing precedent. 
Second, the information provided in the written explanations will 
undoubtedly be monitored by interest groups looking to use disqualification as 
a weapon to shape the outcome of litigation.163 However, even if the written 
explanations are only used for the benevolent purpose of protecting the 
integrity of the Court by assuring the judicial process is impartial, the increased 
knowledge of the recusal process provided by the written explanations will 
bring increased requests for recusal and an increased workload for the Justices. 
If we want the Court to be efficient, we cannot expect the Justices to explain 
everything they do. 
The biggest problem with written explanations, however, is that while they 
sound good in theory, they will be counter-productive in reality, and public 
confidence in the Court will actually decrease. The typical, reasonable citizen 
has only a rudimentary understanding of the mechanics and realities of the 
judicial system in general, much less of the Supreme Court.164 They question 
the impartiality of the Justices without considering the wide range of factors 
the recusal standard seeks to balance.165 Additionally, “people who have not 
served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts 
concerning the integrity of judges.”166 As a result, there is a tension between 
when people expect Justices to recuse themselves because of an appearance of 
potential bias, and when the standard actually calls for recusal.167 
For example, a typical, reasonable citizen might worry that a Justice who 
knows the parties, government officials, or lawyers in front of the Court cannot 
be impartial. However, throughout their careers, judges acquire friends, former 
colleagues, and former law clerks. Supreme Court Justices, in particular, “hold 
the type of credentials that create even more ties over the course of [their] 
career such that it would not be unusual to expect connections between the 
Justice and the players (both the parties and the law firms) who appear before 
the Supreme Court.”168 In fact, many of the elite attorneys who appear in the 
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Supreme Court have clerked for the very Justices before whom they are 
arguing.169 Additionally, Justice Scalia noted the “well-known and constant 
practice of Justices’ [sic] enjoying friendship and social intercourse with 
Members of Congress and officers of the Executive Branch . . . .”170 He also 
freely admitted that “many Justices have reached this Court precisely because 
they were friends of the incumbent President or other senior officials . . . “171 
Contrary to what the public may think, the connections between the Justices 
and the parties and attorneys who appear in front of the Court are not at odds 
with goals of the legal system. It is important that judges continue their social 
lives after being appointed to the bench so they are “sufficiently personally 
involved in their societies and communities so that they can understand the 
experiences of those before them, [and] understand the real life ramifications 
of their decisions . . . .”172 
Another example is a typical, reasonable citizen might worry that a Justice 
who has opinions and has made past statements about controversial issues 
cannot be impartial when those issue comes before the Court. However, in the 
case of Supreme Court Justices, the absence of opinions or comments is more 
illustrative of indifference and a lack of qualification, than a lack of bias.173 
Most Justices are middle-aged before they are appointed to the Supreme 
Court.174 They are “strong-minded” men and women.175 It would be “not 
merely unusual, but extraordinary” if Justices had not formulated notions or 
expressed opinions regarding constitutional issues they had encountered prior 
to taking the bench.176 As one commentator said, “[W]e should not so highly 
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value the appearance (or even the reality) of impartiality that we would require 
a judge to come to the bench as a blank slate.”177 
A third example is that a typical, reasonable citizen might worry that a 
Justice whose spouse has publicly spoken about an issue before the Court 
cannot be impartial. For example, Virginia Thomas is a very vocal opponent of 
the Obama administration’s health care reform law, and many observers 
wondered if Justice Thomas could be impartial when the case, which means so 
much to his wife, was challenged before the Supreme Court.178 However, we 
do not want Justices’ families to be unduly handicapped in their own 
professional lives.179 As such, federal law does not bar a Justice from 
participating in any matter in which their family members have an ideological 
interest.180 Stephen Gillers, one of the nation’s leading ethics experts, 
explained, “[a] spouse of a judge can have a full political life and take 
positions on political issues and legal issues, even ones that come before his or 
her spouse.”181 Steven Lubet, an ethics professor at Northwestern Law School, 
agreed and stated, “two-career families are now the norm and there are no 
constraints on the political activities of judicial spouses.”182 David Garrow, a 
historian at Cambridge University, added that in a democracy, Virginia 
Thomas’s public comments are “utterly proper,” if not “utterly commendable.” 
183 Justice Thomas also received support from a former colleague; retired 
Justice John Paul Stevens stated “I wouldn’t think there’s any possibility that 
any of the activities of Mrs. Thomas have had any impact on the analysis of 
Judge Thomas.”184 
A final example is that a typical, reasonable citizen might worry that a 
Justice who has been publicly insulted and harshly criticized by an individual 
cannot be impartial when that individual comes before the Court. “After all, 
judges are human beings who may take umbrage at that and may end up 
holding it against the person.”185 However, Canon 14 of the original 1924 
Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that a judge “should not be swayed by 
partisan demands, public clamor or considerations of personal popularity or 
notoriety, nor be apprehensive of unjust criticism.”186 We cannot have a system 
in which criticism leads to automatic recusal because then “people can just 
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judge-shop simply by insulting enough judges.”187 Similarly, we cannot have a 
system where the media is given “a veto over participation of any Justices.”188 
First, the media “may not be an accurate proxy for public opinion.”189 Second, 
the media also tends to generate a controversy where none exists.190 Recusals 
based on criticisms and clamoring by individuals and the media would only 
“encourage so-called investigative journalists to suggest improprieties, and 
demand recusals, for other inappropriate (and increasingly silly) reasons.”191 
Therefore, as Chief Justice Roberts explained in his Year End Report, “Such 
concerns have no role to play in deciding a question of recusal.”192 
The previous four examples illustrate the discrepancy between the 
expectations of typical, reasonable citizens and the realities of the legal system. 
Written explanations will lead to less confidence in the Court, rather than 
more, when people expect a Justice to recuse him or herself and become 
confused, disappointed, or outraged when it turns out the standard doesn’t call 
for recusal.193 Written explanations will lead to less confidence in the Court 
when the public realizes the recusal statute is not clear cut194 and each Justice 
is left to personally decide “(a) what evidence of ‘impartiality’ is enough to 
trigger recusal, (b) whose ‘questioning’ of the judge’s impartiality is to be 
taken into account, and (c) when such questioning is deemed to be 
‘reasonable.’”195 
III.  THE RECUSAL PROCESS IS NOT BROKEN, SO QUIT TRYING TO FIX IT 
The Supreme Court recusal process is certainly not perfect, but revising it 
is not necessary at this point despite public clamoring to the contrary. It is a 
manufactured crisis. Demands that Justice Kagan and Justice Thomas recuse 
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themselves from deciding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act were 
not made to protect the integrity of the Court;196 they were partisan attempts to 
gain an advantage when the Affordable Care Act came before the Court. 
Nonetheless, the demands triggered a general fear that the Supreme Court 
recusal process is broken and in need of repair. The reality, however, is that the 
recusal process has served our country well for over 200 years.197 As Chief 
Justice Roberts noted in his Year End Report, “[t]hroughout our Nation’s 
history, instances of judges abandoning their oath ‘to faithfully and impartially 
discharge and perform’ the duties of their office have been exceedingly 
rare.”198 
Health care reform is a politically polarizing issue. Democratic presidents 
since Harry Truman have tried and failed to pass health care reform.199 After a 
year of bitter partisan combat, President Obama was finally able to do so in 
2010.200 It has long been acknowledged that parties may question a Justice’s 
impartiality in an attempt to avoid the judge’s adverse decision.201 In 
politically charged cases when a party moves to recuse a judge, the odds are 
that the party is not simply civic-minded and trying to ensure the judicial 
process is fair; the party is trying to shape the legal outcome.202 Typically 
Supreme Court cases, particularly those related to abortion, homosexuality, 
and affirmative action, are very politically charged.203 The stakes are high, the 
impact is broad, the issues are divisive, and the decisions often turn on the vote 
of a single Justice.204 In these cases, “you can come up with an accusation of 
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political conflict in almost any of them.”205 Justices often are close friends, or 
at the very least socialize, with high-ranking government officials.206 Justices 
are aligned with either the Democratic or Republican Party and each president 
tries to appoint individuals to the Court whose views on key issues are 
consistent with his own.207 And before coming to the bench, Justices have 
typically made public comments regarding their stance on constitutional 
interpretation and issues facing the nation.208 
The demands for Justices Kagan and Thomas to disqualify themselves 
from hearing the challenges to the Affordable Care Act were likely attempts to 
gain an advantage in the litigation.209 “Criticism on ethics issues is often a 
proxy for political disapproval with how you expect a justice to vote.”210 In 
this case, the political right presumed that Justice Elena Kagan would vote in 
favor of the law and called for her recusal, hoping to improve the possibility 
that the law would fail.211 Her critics accused her of being too biased to hear 
the health care case, claiming that as Solicitor General, Kagan strategized 
about the law, advised the Obama administration on the law, and also 
expressed opinions on its constitutional merits in violation of the recusal 
rules.212 The political left, on the other hand, presumed that Justice Clarence 
Thomas would vote to strike down the law, and called for his recusal, hoping 
to improve the chances the law would be upheld.213 His critics accused him of 
being too biased to hear the health care case because his wife spent significant 
time and effort, and earned a great deal of money, lobbying against the law.214 
Both sides of the argument knew the Court’s overall credibility was in play and 
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accusing Justices of being unethical can be politically powerful and undermine 
the credibility of the Court’s decision.215 
There are many critics who argue that the calls for Justice Kagan’s and 
Justice Thomas’ recusals are indicative of a much larger concern about the 
effectiveness of the recusal process generally. However, there is very little 
evidence that bias on the Supreme Court is a problem. First, Supreme Court 
Justices are well qualified to hold their positions and committed to their duties. 
“They are jurists of exceptional integrity and experience.”216 They have been 
subjected to a “rigorous appointment and confirmation process,”217 which 
tested their character and ensured they were fit to hold a lifetime appointment 
to the Court. While on the Court, the Justices continue to follow high ethical 
standards and are “deeply committed to the common interest in preserving the 
Court’s vital role as an impartial tribunal governed by the rule of law.”218 
Professor Charles Geyh explained to the House Committee on the Judiciary 
that “it is extremely rare . . . for a judge to willfully refuse to disqualify himself 
under circumstances in which the judge knows he must. On the whole . . . our 
judges are too committed to impartial justice for any but the isolated bad apple 
to do that . . . .”219 Bias has not historically been a problem on the Court,220 and 
it seems unlikely it will become a problem in the near future. As Harvard law 
professor and Supreme Court historian Noah Feldman said, “Today, with 
information moving as fast as it does, it would be very difficult for any justice 
to hide any improprieties . . . .”221 
Critics of the recusal process have cited declining Supreme Court approval 
ratings as evidence the process is broken. Since 2000, public approval “of the 
way the Supreme Court handles its job” has fluctuated between a high of sixty-
two percent and a low of forty-two percent.222 The fluctuation, however, is not 
because of concern about possible ethical transgressions by the Justices, but is 
better explained by broad national discontent and disagreement with politically 
controversial decisions by the Court.223 For example, in 2003, after the 
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Supreme Court struck down a Texas law making homosexual sex a crime,224 
and upheld the affirmative action admissions policy at the University of 
Michigan Law School, approval ratings dipped from sixty percent to fifty-two 
percent.225 The Court’s approval rating continued to fall in 2005 to an all-time 
low of forty-two percent after decisions involving eminent domain,226 medical 
marijuana,227 and government displays of religious symbols.228 After a brief 
recovery in 2006, the Supreme Court’s approval ratings dipped again in 2007 
and 2008 to around fifty percent.229 These lower ratings were attributed to both 
a broad decline in public confidence in the Congress, the President, the press, 
labor unions, the medical system, and the criminal justice system,230 and the 
Court’s controversial ruling upholding the federal law that banned partial-birth 
abortion.231 
The Supreme Court began its 2011-2012 term with an approval rating of 
forty-two percent, the second lowest recorded rating.232 In keeping with the 
trend, this low rating has been explained by both a controversial, political 
decision by the Court and broad national discontent. The Supreme Court’s 
approval rating has been declining since its Citizens United decision in January 
2010,233 and the ratings have been unable to rebound amidst “profound 
cynicism about our capitalist democracy” and acutely polarized politics.234 The 
nation has been at war for over a decade.235 Thirteen million Americans are 
unemployed.236 Four million Americans have lost their homes to foreclosure, 
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and home prices have continued to drop significantly in the last five years237 in 
what has been the biggest housing slump since the Great Depression.238 
Congress is universally deplored: on average in 2011, only seventeen percent 
of Americans approved of the way Congress handled its job, including a low of 
eleven percent in December 2011.239 President Obama’s approval ratings have 
been consistently among the most polarized for a president in the last sixty 
years.240 An average of eighty percent of Democrats approved of the job he 
was doing in 2011, while only twelve percent of Republicans approved.241 
The roots of current criticisms of the Supreme Court recusal process are 
political posturing, an uneasy nation, and controversial decisions by the Court, 
not evidence of an actual problem of bias. Therefore, the recusal process 
should be left alone. It has been used for two centuries through social 
revolutions, political unrest, times of war, and times of prosperity. And the 
changes being advocated would fundamentally change the Supreme Court as 
an institution. As Russell Wheeler of the Brookings’ Institute stated: “This 
may just be a situation we live with because any cure is worse than what we 
have now.”242 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of recusal is extremely important because a fair and impartial 
judge is essential to the American notion of justice. While Supreme Court 
Justices have always determined for themselves whether or not to recuse, and 
their decisions are not reviewable, criticisms of this process have recently 
saturated the news. The criticisms, however, are misguided and based on 
misunderstandings about Supreme Court Justices. These critics seem to ignore 
the historical evidence as the recusal process has been used for over two 
centuries and has served our country well. The critics also fail to consider that 
“impartiality and diligence are obligations that permeate every aspect of 
judicial life—obligations that each [Justice] has the unflagging responsibility 
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to police for himself.”243 They downplay that Justice Kagan and Justice 
Thomas are the latest targets of “the Washington obsession with turning 
substantive disagreements into supposed ethical transgressions” in an attempt 
to shape the Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the health care reform 
law.244 And they do not acknowledge that Americans are unhappy with 
everything these days. 
Is the recusal process perfect? No. But neither are the proposed solutions. 
Creating a review process for Supreme Court recusal decisions would require 
the Justices to sit in judgment of one another, or worse yet, involve violating 
the Constitutional mandate of “one supreme Court.” Further, requiring the 
Justices to issue written explanations for their recusal decisions would be 
intrusive, burdensome, and counter-productive. Justice Scalia said it best when 
he told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “I think we can stumble along 
the way we are.”245 
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